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B.

INTRODUCTION

Most analyses of the financial crisis of 2007-2008 assign a
large causal role to inflated credit ratings. Credit rating agency
reforms enacted under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), 1 as well as earlier
rule changes implemented by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), address several factors that contributed to
inflated ratings, but fail to target the ratings flaw implicated
most directly in the crisis. I propose an additional reform to
address this flaw.
The flaw lay in ratings of "second-Ievel"2 mortgage securitizations: individual mortgages were pooled and securities sold
against them, and some of these "first-level" securities were
then re-pooled and sold in collateralized debt obligations
(CnOs). The structure of the cno promises steady returns
under normal economic conditions, followed by a large loss
1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
2. See Frank Partnoy, Overdependence on Credit Rating Agencies Was a Primary Cause of the Crisis 4-7 (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Research Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 27, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
soI3/papers.cfm?abstracUd= 1427167## (referring to "first-Ievel n and "second-level" securitizations); Press Release, Bank for Int'l Settlements [BIS]
Joint Forum, Credit Risk Transfer: Developments from 2005 to 2007, at 6 (July
2008) [hereinafter Credit Risk Transfer], available at http://www.bis.org/
publ(joint21.pdf (referring to "one-Iayern and "two-layer" securitizations).
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during a period of system-wide stress. The steady returns, abetted by high credit ratings, can provide an illusion of safety and
hide the risk of large losses. For this reason, many commentators believe the sale of enos should be restricted or banned. 3
I argue against banning the construction and sale of
enos, and instead propose a ceiling on the credit ratings assigned to them. This ceiling would severely hamper CDOs' use
in hiding risk without impeding their use for potentially beneficial purposes. While direct restraints on the rating agencies
may run up against First Amendment obstacles, the same objective could be achieved through regulation of the sale of
CDOs.
This may appear to be a case of closing the barn door
when the horse is far afield, as the CDO market has collapsed
since the crisis. But memories are short in financial markets. I
would argue that a more apt metaphor is that of patching a
crack in the dam holding back systemic risk while the river is
dry. The fact that risk will eventually find its way to other pressure points in the dam is no reason not to fix the crack we see.
This paper aims first to provide an account of securitization, ratings, and their role in the crisis for the lay reader.
With this background, I propose a eDO rating ceiling and explain why it is needed despite other rating industry reforms.
Section I supplies several preliminary definitions. Section II
provides a brief overview of the structured financial products
at the heart of the crisis. Section III describes how these products are rated, and the role and function of ratings in financial
markets. Section IV gives an account of the role these products
and ratings played in the financial crisis. Section V proposes a
rating ceiling and briefly critiques other reforms and reform
proposals in light of their effectiveness at addressing ratings'
role in the crisis. Section VI proposes an additional reform
and concludes.

3. E.g., Nouriel Roubini: Forget Subprime Mortgages. It's the Subprime Financial System We Need To Fix., TELEGRAPH, May 4, 2010, http://www.telegraph.
co.uk/finance/financetopics/financia\Crisis/7675641/Nouriel-Rou bini-forget-sub-prime-mortgages.-Its-the-sub-prime-financial-system-we-need -tofix.html ("securities like CD Os ... must be heavily regulated if not banned .
. . . [T]hey don't transfer risk so much as mask it under the cover of esoteric
and ultimately misleading risk-management strategies.").
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1.
DEFINITIONS

A.

Mortgages

The mortgages at the heart of the crisis were of two types:
subprime and Alt-A. Subprime applies to borrowers with poor
credit scores, while Alt-A describes loans with relatively risky
underwriting features, such as little or no documentation of
income, and high ratios of loan size to home value. 4

B.

Structured products

A securitization, or structured financial product,:; refers to
the aggregation of assets into a "pool," and the issuance of
bonds funded and collateralized by that pool.6 A eno can refer to the securitization of unstructured products, such as corporate loans and bonds (also referred to as collateralized loan
obligations or collateralized bond obligations, respectively), or
to the securitization of structured products. Structured products that might go into the collateral pool of a cno include
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), which securitize home mortgages; commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS), which securitize mortgages on commercial properties; and asset-backed securities (ABS) , which securitize various
assets such as credit card receivables, student loans, and auto
loans. 7 CDOs that securitize corporate loans or bonds are, like
RMBS, CMBS, and ABS, "first-level" securitizations. CDOs
securitizing structured products are "second-level" - securitizations of securitizations. 8 This paper is concerned with the latter category, also referred to as ABS eDOs or structured finance cnos. Unless otherwise specified, I will use eno in this
paper to refer to structured finance CDOs.
4. Adam B. Ashcraft & Til Schuermann, Understanding the Securitization
of Subprime MOTtgage Credit 2 (Wharton Fin. lnsts. Ctr., Working Paper No. 0743,2008), availahle at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstracUd=
1071189.
5. I use "securitization" interchangeably with "structured financial product" or "structured product" in this paper, although a securitization, unlike a
structured product, does not necessarily involve a hierarchy of tranches on
the liability side. See infra Section ILA
6. This process is described in detail infra Section ILA.
7. See Credit Risk Transfer, supra note 2, app. at 36.
8. See Partnoy, supra note 2, at 5-6.
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Another type of structured finance CDO is the COOsquared, which securitizes other CDO tranches. While one occasionally sees references to CDO-cubeds, the collateral for
these exponential cnos was usually a melange of securities
that had gone through varying numbers of securitization iterations.9
C.

Ratings

The credit rating industry has traditionally been dominated by three rating firms (the "Big Three"): Moody's, Standard & Poor's (S&P) , and Fitch. 1o They use similar symbolic
rating scales to assess the default probability (S&P and Fitch)
or expected losses (Moody's) of debt instruments. The ratings
may be thought of as ordinal rankings of credit risk, with Aaa
TABLE

1:

MEANING OF CREDIT RATINGS

Credit Rating Agency
Moody's
S&:P

Credit Quality

Fitch

Investment grade

Highest credit quality
High credit quality
Strong payment capacity
Adequate payment capacity

Aaa

Aal toAa3
Al to A3
Baal to Baa3

AAA
AA+ toAAA+ to ABBB+ to BBE-

AAA
AA
A
BBB

Speculative grade
Possibility of credit risk
Bal to Ba3
BB+ to BBBB
Significant credit risk
Bl to B3
B
B+ to BHigh credit risk
Caal to Caa3
GGG+ to GGG- CGG
Default is likely / imminent Ca
CC,C
CG,G
In default
C
SD,D
D
Source: Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Preliminary Report: Credit Ratings and the
Financial Crisis

9. See, e.g., Anna Katherine Barnett-Hart, The Story of the CDO Market
Meltdown: An Empirical Analysis 29 (March 19, 2009) (unpublished A.B.
thesis, HaIVard University), available at http://www.hks.haIVard.edu/m-rc
bgl studentsl dunlop/2009-CDOmeltdown.pdf (showing "average number
of resecuritizations of ... CDO collateral for underwriters, "calculated as
the weighted average number of CDO repackaging iterations in each underwriter's CDOs," and ranging as high as 4.17 for Citigroup and 4.79 for Merrill Lynch).
10. See Lawrence White, The Credit Rating Agencies and the Subprime Debacle,
21 CRlTIG\L REv. 389, 389-91 (2009).
ft
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(Moody's) or AAA (S&P and Fitch) the highest, and Ca
(Moody's) or C (S&P and Fitch) the lowest before default. l l
Table 1 provides the scales used by each agency.
The rating agencies resist the notion that precise
probability estimates can be matched to these letter grades,12
but the growth of structured finance has created the need for
such precision to infonn the parameter estimates of the COO
rating models. The Big Three now publish historical default
rates, or "idealized" default probabilities, for each rating that
they use in modeling CDOS.13 Ratings agencies have also traditionally claimed that the meaning of ratings is constant across
asset classes; one should assume, therefore, that the
probability of default for a AAA-rated cno tranche is roughly
the same as for a AAA-rated senior unsecured bond issued by a
corporation. While the rating agencies now provide separate
rating definitions for different asset classes and issuer types,14
this is still the standard to which the agencies aspire. 15 Finally,
it is worth emphasizing here that ratings are meant to convey
only credit risk, not other kinds of risk (such as market risk,
interest rate risk, or liquidity risk).

11. For ease of exposition, I will use the Fitch scale (AAA, AA, A, BBB)
throughout the paper.
12. STANDARD & POOR'S, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF STRUCTURED FINANCE
RATINGS 9 (Aug. 23, 2007) [hereinafter STANDARD & POOR'S, FUNDAMENTALS
OF STRUCTURED FINANCE RATINGS], availahll! at http://www2.standardand
poors.com/spf/pdf/fIxedincome/Fundamentals_SF_Ratings.pdf ("To attach precise expected default rates to any rating category is to imbue the
rating process with a degree of scientifIc accuracy that it could not possibly
bear, and which has never been claimed for it.").
13. See John M. Griffin & Dragon Yongjun Tang, Did Subjectivity Playa
Rnll! in CDO Credit Ratings? 69 (Am. Fin. Assoc. 2010 Atlanta Meetings Paper,
2009), availahll! at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstracUd=13
64933.
14. See STANDARD & POOR'S, RATING DEFlNmoNS (May 3,2010), http://
www.5tandardandpoors.com/ratings/ definitions-and-faqs/ en/ us (follow
"Ratings Definitions" hyperlink); MOODY'S, RATING SYMBOLS AND DEFINmONS
Uuly 2010), http://v3.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?
docid=PBC_79004.
15. STANDARD & POOR'S, FUNDAMENTALS OF STRUCTURED FINANCE RATINGS, supra note 12, at 10.
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II.
THE PRODUCTS

A.

The products: RMBS and CDOs

Two types of rated products contributed to the cnSlS
through their poor performance. The first are RMBS, particularly those collateralized by subprime and Alt-A mortgages. Individual mortgages are pooled together into a special purpose
vehicle called a real estate mortgage investment conduit
(REMIC). The vehicle is created solely to hold the mortgages
and issue bonds to investors, and is "bankruptcy remote" from
the institution creating it. 16 The REMIC issues bonds in
tranches, with more highly rated tranches having repayment
priority. The highest-rated tranche of RMBS backed by subprime loans typically constitutes approximately 80 percent of
the deal structure. I7 As a simplified illustration, if the total outstanding principal of the mortgages in the collateral pool at
the moment of launch is $100 million, the principal of the
AAA-rated RMBS will be $80 million. Investors will pay $80 million to buy these bonds, and will accept a relatively low rate of
interest ("coupon"), as these bonds will not suffer principal
losses until the principal of all lower tranches is exhausted. Investors in lower-rated tranches receive a higher coupon in return for a higher risk of default.
As illustrated in Figure 1, interest paid on the mortgages
in the collateral pool is used to make RMBS holders' coupon
payments in a priority "waterfall" each month - first the AAArated bondholders receive their coupon payments in full, then
the AA-rated bondholders, then the A-rated bondholders, and
so on.
Principal payments go exclusively to the senior tranche
for an extended period (usually three years), after which they,
too, may be disbursed pro rata, as long as certain threshold

16. "Bankruptcy remote" means that if the REMIC's sponsor bank files
for bankruptcy, its general creditors cannot reach the mortgages held by the
REMIC. Similarly, if the mortgages default, the sponsor bank is under no
legal obligation to make the RMBS holders whole.
17. Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 4, at 45.
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tests (relating, for example, to delinquencies and defaults) are
met. IS
The second product at the heart of the crisis was the
COO. The structure of the COO is similar to that of the RMBS,
with several important differences. First, COO collateral, as
noted above, consists not of mortgages or consumer loans, but
of other rated securities. 19 Second, cnos are much less uniform than RMBS. RMBS became largely standardized in the
years leading up to the crisis; COOs were generally custombuilt, which made independent analysis more challenging. 2o
Finally, many cnos were managed. While RMBS collateral was
fixed at the moment of its creation, COO collateral could
often be bought and sold, in accordance with covenanted
minimums and maximums as to the credit ratings of acquired
collateral and various metrics of diversification. 21

18. See Gary Gorton, The Subfnime Panic 6-12 (Yale Int'} Ctr. for Fin.,
Working Paper No. 08-25, 2008) [hereinafter Gorton, Subfnime Panic]. available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1276047.
19.Id.
20.Id.
21. ld.
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CDO portfolios consisted primarily of junior tranches of
ABS and RMBS. The average initial rating of CDO collateral
from 2005 through 2007 was A.22 In a sample of more than
3,000 RMBS issued between 2001-2007, the average A-rated
tranche of a subprime RMBS would begin to take losses when
collateral principal losses reached roughly ten percent, and be
completely wiped out when losses approached ftfteen percent. 23 In RMBS backed principally by Alt-A mortgages, the Arated tranche would typically begin taking losses at around ftve
percent, and be wiped out at roughly 6.5 percent. 24 Figure 2
illustrates the structure of a Mezzanine CDO backed by subprime mortgages.
FIGURE 2: CDO BACKED
Mortgages

g
g

MEZZANINE RMBS TRANcHEs
CDO Balance Sheet
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Equity tranche: 4%

Source: Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Preliminary Repart: Credit Ratings and the
Financial Crisis

CD Os with collateral rated A or above are called "High
Grade" ABS CDOs; cnos with collateral primarily rated BBB
are called "Mezzanine," or "Mezz," ABS CDOS.25
22. Barnett-Hart, supra note 9, at 24.
23. Adam A5hcraft et aI., MRS Ratings and the Mortgage Credit Boom tbl. 1
(European Banking Ctr. Discussion Paper, 2010), availahle at http://papers.
ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstracUd=1615613.
24. ld.
25. See generally Gorton, Subprime Panic, supra note 18, at 13.
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In the period from 2005-2007, the issuance of structured
finance cnos tripled, and COO portfolios became increasingly concentrated in subprime mortgages. 26 As illustrated in
Table 2, high-grade cnos, on average, had half their portfolios invested in subprime RMBS, a quarter invested in other
RMBS, and almost one-fifth invested in other cno tranches.
More than three-quarters of the average Mezz cno portfolio
was devoted to subprime RMBS, with most of the rest invested
in other RMBS or CDOS.27
TABLE

2: TYPICAL COLLATERAL COMPOSITION OF ABS CDOs
High grade
ABSCDO

Mezzanine
ABSCDO

Subprime RMBS

50

77

OtherRMBS

25

12

cno

19

6

Other

6

5

Source: Bank for International Settlements, Credit Risk Transfer: Deuelopmentsfrom 2005
to 2007

While High-Grade CDOs might seem at first glance a
"safer" bet than Mezz COOs, it is worth noting that their AAA
tranches could default after portfolio principal losses exceeded only six percent; Mezz COO AAA tranches, on the
other hand, typically required portfolio losses of more than 19
percent before they were breached. 28 ABS CDOs backed at
least in part by subprime RMBS tranches doubled from $77
billion in 2005 to $150 billion in 2006, and remained above
$100 billion in 2007. 29

B.

The logic of tranching

The principle behind the tranche structure of both RMBS
and cnos is that collateral assets are exceedingly unlikely to
default all at once and lose 100 percent of their value. By con26. Credit Risk Transfer, supra note 2, at 5.
27.Id.
28. Id. at 53.
29. Gorton, Subprime Panic, supra note 18, at 17.
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centrating losses at the bottom of the tranche structure, "safe"
bonds can be created from riskier collateral assets. All that is
needed is that the bonds be imperfectly correlated. Coval,
Jurek and Stafford (Coval et al.) provide a trenchant illustration of this process. 30 Assume for two mortgages of equal face
value that each has a 0.9 probability of paying off in full and a
0.1 probability of defaulting and paying nothing. Assume further that the mortgages are pooled and two securities of equal
face value are issued against the pool, one senior and one junior. For the junior bond to default, it is enough that either
mortgage defaults. For the senior bond to default, both mortgages must default. In order to determine the default
probabilities of the bonds, we must estimate the correlation of
the underlying mortgages. Figure 3 illustrates the process if
there is no correlation.
In this case, the probability of default for the senior bond
will be 0.01,31 and the probability of default for the juniorbond will be 0.19. 32
As we increase the number of mortgages in the pool, an
increasing fraction of the bonds backed by the pool will be
"safer" - that is, have a lower probability of defaulting - than
the weighted average probability of default of the collateral. 33
Figure 4 illustrates this.
In figure 4 there are three mortgages each with a 0.1
probability of default; assuming no correlation, two of the
three resulting bonds backed by the pool have a probability of
30. Joshua D. Coval et al., The Economics of Structured Finance, 23 J. ECON.
3. 6-7 (2009). available at http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/lO.
1257/jep.23.1.3.
31. The joint default probability for two mortgages can be found by the
equation:
PI and 2 = PI P2 + P'.2 (P,(l-P,)P2 (I-P 2»1/2
where PI is the probability of the first mortgage defaulting, P 2 is the
probability of the second mortgage defaulting, and PI.2 is the correlation
coefficient for the mortgage defaults. The mathematics of correlation across
more than two variables is beyond the scope of this paper, though we draw
on its results below. Here, as there is no correlation, the probability of joint
default is 0.1 x 0.1 = 0.01.
32. A simple and intuitive way to compute this is first to calculate the
likelihood that neither bond defaults (0.9 x 0.9) and then subtract this from
1 to determine the likelihood that at least one bond defauIL~: 1 - (0.9 x 0.9) =
0.19.
33. Coval et aI., supra note 30, at 7.
PERSPS.
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FIGURE
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TRANCHED MBS WITH No CORRELATION ACROSS
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default less than 0.1. 34 This is the process that led to such large
percentages of subprime-backed RMBS and mezzanine enos
being labeled as "safe."
Problems may arise with this structure, however, when
mortgage default probabilities are correlated. As the correlation of the underlying collateral performance rises, the risk of
default for the senior bond rises, as well. In the polar case,
where there is perfect correlation in collateral performance,
the default probability for each bond will be the same as for
each of the assets in the collateral pool. If the mortgages have
a 0.1 probability of default, each bond, regardless of its
tranche position, will have a 0.1 probability of default. Tranching will accomplish nothing in this case, and the senior-most
bond will be no safer than the junior-most. Section IV.A. below
discusses the problems posed by correlation further.

34. As long as defaults are uncorrelated, the likelihood that in a pool of n
mortgages, there will be defaults less than or equal to a given number k can
be determined by the cumulative binomial distribution function. The
formula is:

,

P(X<k)=l:
-

;.0

n'.

~(l-)""

(k!( n-k)!) l'

P

where n is the number of mortgages, k is the number of defaults, and p is the
probability of default for any given mortgage.
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4: TRANCHED MBS WITH No CORRELATION ACROSS
(THREE) UNDERLYING MORTGAGES
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C.

The economics

Why do we pool and tranche assets into these securitized
products in the first place? There are several possible market
imperfections to which structured finance responds. These include transaction costs, market segmentation, market incompleteness, and asymmetric information. 35 I discuss these each
in turn here, but caution at the outset that these are not the
only motivating forces in structured finance. Regulatory arbitrage and risk hiding (discussed further in Section IV.A.3)
were likely at least as important in explaining the explosion in
securitization leading up to the crisis.

1.

Transaction costs

Some investors may wish to extend their portfolios to sectors and industries to which, absent structured finance, access
would be impracticable. Consumer credit and residential
35. Peter M. DeMarzo, The Pooling and Tranching of Securities: A Model of
Informed Intermediation, 18 REv. FIN. STUD. 1. 2 (2005); Janet Mitchell. Financial Intermediation Theory and Implications far the Sources of Value in Structured
Financial Markets 12 (Nat'l Bank of Belg., Working Paper No. 71, 2005).
available at http://aei.pitt.edu/5738/01/wp71En.pdf.
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mortgages are prime examples of this. A mutual or pension
fund that wanted to invest in residential real estate would not
be able to buy portions of individual mortgages; the transaction costs would be prohibitive. By pooling mortgages and selling claims on the pool, structured finance reduces the transaction costs to a point where it becomes practicable for institutions to buy into these sectors.

2.

Market segmentation

By concentrating losses at the lower end of the tranche
hierarchy, structured finance creates "safe" debt at the top of
the tranche hierarchy. This creation of safe debt may serve a
segment of the market that places a premium on safe debt,
due to "restrictions imposed by preferences, investment mandates, or regulation,"36 as well as the need for collateral for
derivatives transactions and repurchase ("repo") agreements.
These uses of AAA-rated bonds are discussed in more detail in
section IV.b., below. Some commentators argue that there was
indeed an "insatiable demand" for safe debt in financial markets. 37 The explosive demand for AAA-rated debt could not be
met by the U.S. Treasury or the dwindling number of AAArated corporations. 38 By pooling and tranching, structured financial products created a large number of (seemingly) safe
securities out of riskier collateral, helping to meet this demand.

3.

Market incompleteness

A market where it is not possible to "bet" on a specific
contingency is "incomplete." In a classic statement of the concept, Stephen Ross draws the analogy of a "market where individuals are permitted to purchase a grapefruit only if they also
buy an orange. If, by a fluke, everyone wishes to consume one
grapefruit with one orange, this constraint has no force. Oth36. Mitchell, supra note 35, at 12.
37. Ricardo J. Caballero, The "Other" Imbalance and the Financial Crisis 2
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15636,2010), available
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w 15636.pdf?new_window=l.
38. Gary Gorton, Slapped in the Face by the Invisible Hand: Banking and the
Panic of 2007, 10-13,40 (May 9, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Gorton, Invisible Hand], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.
cfm?abstracUd=1401882.
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erwise, opening separate markets would improve efficiency."39
Ross goes on to describe how options written on "primitive"
assets help complete· markets. In the context of structured finance, it is possible that pooling and tranching allow investors
to gain exposure to particular outcomes that they could not
otherwise have gotten based on any pre-existing combination
of assets and options. For example, when certain investors
wanted to bet that the residential housing market would deteriorate, derivatives (in this case, credit default swaps (CDS»
written on specific tranches of mortgage-backed securities allowed them to target the bets they were making in a way they
may not have been able to without those "primitive" assets.
Other strategies, such as selling short the shares of construction companies, or of banks with large exposures to the residential mortgage market, would likely have proved imperfect
substitutes. 4o

4.

Information asymmetry

Issuers often have more information about the quality of
the collateral of their structured products than investors have.
This could create a "lemons" problem if a pool of collateral
were not tranched, but rather a pure pass-through vehicle with
securities having claims to pro rata shares of the collateral and
its cash flow. A lemons problem exists where information is
asymmetric as to the quality of a product and sellers cannot
credibly communicate high quality to buyers. 41 In a stylized
version of a such a market, there are "good" and "bad" products, and (risk-neutral) buyers will pay only the average value
of the two types, weighted by the perceived likelihood of getting a good or bad result. So if a (risk-neutral) buyer cannot
distinguish product quality ex ante but thinks he has an equal
chance of getting a good product worth $20 or a bad product
worth $10, he will pay up to $15. This result does not, however,
represent an equilibrium; it drives out those selling good products, as buyers will not pay what the product is worth. At the
39. Stephen Ross, Options and Efficiency, 90 QJ. ECON. 75, 75-76 (1976).
40. For an account of how mortgage market bears bet against tranches of
mortgage-backed securities, see MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT (2010).
41. George A. Akerlof, The Market fM "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 QJ. ECON. 488 (1970).
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limit, only bad products remain and the market for higher
quality products collapses.
With a pass-through pool, the seller's retention of a portion of the interest in the pool would not necessarily forestall a
lemons market. The good-product/bad-product quandary applies to any portion of the pool the issuer sells. If the pool has
100 assets each worth $10, and the issuer can convince someone that the average asset value is actually $11, the issuer can
sell an SO-percent interest in the pool for $880. The issuer is
$80 better off, the buyer has gotten a bad bargain, and the
dynamics of the lemons market operate as described above.
There may also be an "ex ante" and an "ex post" aspect to
a lemons market in structured finance. The ex ante element
involves adverse selection - the possibility that the seller will
fill the pool with bad loans. The ex post element involves
moral hazard. Moral hazard may be relevant where, for example, the seller retains servicing rights for the loans it has sold,
and loan performance depends in part on active monitoring
and prompt remedial action in the event of delinquency.
Where the seller no longer retains an interest in loan performance, it may not pursue its servicing duties with as much vigor.
The moral hazard problem is, of course, larger than information asymmetry, but could contribute to information asymmetry if, for example, investors have difficulty judging exactly how
much of an impact the servicer's performance will have on
loan performance.
Tranching can solve the lemons problem. Investors in
structured products may lack information sufficient to judge
the credit quality of an entire pool, but have enough information to feel confident that defaults and losses will not climb
above a certain point. (They may also rely on rating agencies
in developing this sense of confidence, as discussed below.) By
concentrating risk in junior tranches and either holding these
tranches or marketing them to a smaller subset of sophisticated investors competent to judge them, structured finance
arrangers can sell the senior tranches to less sophisticated or
engaged investors without suffering a lemons discount. This
dynamic makes tranching essential to the successful marketing
of most structured financial products.
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CDOs vs. RMBS on the economics

The above explanations of structured finance apply with
different force to "first-level" securitizations such as RMBS,
and "second-level" securitizations such as cnos. While transaction costs provide a clear rationale for the pooling involved
in RMBS, they do not for cnos. It is as easy for an institutional
investor to invest in an RMBS as a CDO. CDOs do not provide
access to sectors that it would otheIWise be impracticable for
investors to access.
Market segmentation does seem to apply to cnos as
much as to RMBS, at least with respect to the large demand of
many institutional investors for "safe," AAA-rated securities.
The first level of securitization can produce, say, $80 million
worth of "safe" bonds out of $100 million worth of "risky" assets; the second level of securitization may take $10 million of
the "risky" junior tranches from the first level and create $8
million more worth of "safe" debt. It is worth briefly noting
here that from 2005 through 2007, the creation of risky
tranches at the first level could not keep up with demand, and
a number of COOs were built synthetically through the use of
CDS.42
To the degree that structured finance helps to complete
markets, it is possible that COOs could create opportunities
for bets that would not otherwise exist, just as RMBS do. Information asymmetry, on the other hand, is less likely to apply to
CDOs than to RMBS. This is because cnos are composed of
rated securities. Ratings are easy to understand and are the
product of a third-party assessment. nespite the many imperfections of ratings and the ratings process, ratings probably
provide investors with enough information to prevent a lemons market, even without tranching. Valuing the consumer
loans that constitute first-level securitizations such as RMBS,
on the other hand, is much more difficult, with myriad potentially relevant hard and soft variables 43 and no comprehensive
third-party assessment of each individual loan (though the
42. See Credit Risk Transfer, supra note 2, at 5.
43. See Uday Rajan et al., The Failure of Models That Predict Failure: Distance,
Incentives and Defaults 5-6 (Chi. Grad. Sch. Bus. Research Paper No. 08-19,
2010), available at http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/facseminars/event/fin
ance/documents/fin_04_09_ sem.pdf (describing the importance of "soft"
variables in predicting defaults).
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credit bureaus do provide credit scores for the individual borrower). The problem of infonnation asymmetry is therefore
likely to be more serious at the first level than at the second
level of securitization. Even for an investor who trusts entirely
in ratings, some tranching at the first level would likely be necessary to prevent a lemons market. This is because it is virtually
certain that there will be some losses on a pool of thousands of
consumer loans or mortgages. Because any shortfall of promised interest or principal constitutes a default, the credit rating
on a pure pass-through pool would necessarily be "likely to default," which would not help solve the lemons problem. There
must be some buffer for a higher rating to attach, which would
require, at the very least, an equity tranche whose claimant
bears the residual risk.
III.
THE RATINGS

Ratings have been central to structured finance, and despite provisions of Dodd-Frank that will diminish or remove
statutory and regulatory reliance on ratings,44 they will likely
continue to playa key role in the construction and marketing
of RMBS and COOs. In this section we briefly consider the
function of ratings in the market, and then examine the
mechanics of structured finance ratings.
A. The Junctions oj ratings
Ratings are used by regulators and private actors to two
principal ends: risk management and promoting capital market efficiency.

1.

Risk management

Regulators. Regulators have used ratings for decades to
prescribe holding and capital requirements for financial institutions and investment funds. 45 During the years leading up to
the crisis, these prescriptions were mandated by a raft of statutory and regulatory references to ratings. 46 Eligible ratings
44. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
45. See Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two
ThurrWs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619. 690-703
(1999) .
46. Id.
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were restricted to those issued by Nationally Registered Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs), as designated by the
SEC. 47 The Dodd-Frank Act, however, provides for the removal of a number of statutory references to the rating agencies and orders federal agencies to remove regulatory references over the course of next year. 48 It is unclear what risk
management metrics the federal agencies will use in place of
ratings, but they may continue to use ratings as part of a mix of
factors to determine creditworthiness in regulating institutional holdings. Many state insurance regulators continue to
employ ratings to establish holding and capital requirements
for insurance companies.49
Investment funds. Money management institutions usually
adopt guidelines limiting permissible investments by rating
classification. According to a 2007 survey of 200 fund managers and plan sponsors in the United States and Europe, 86 percent of fund managers and 92 percent of plan sponsors explicidy rely on ratings in their investment guidelines. 50 Ratingsbased restrictions are assumed voluntarily by fund managers to
resolve a principal-agent problem inherent in the relationship
between investor and fund manager. The fund manager takes
a cut of any investment gains, but, due to limited liability, suffers truncated losses in the event of an investment turned sour.
Because of this, he or she will often have an incentive to take
excessive risks from the investors' perspective. The use of ratings-based restrictions limits the risk that fund managers can
take on, thus easing investor concerns and aiding fund formation.

47. The Big Three firms were grandfathered in as NRSROs; for many
years thereafter it was virtually impossible for other agencies to attain this
status. This changed with the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006,
which streamlined the NRSRO registration process for new agencies. There
are currently 10 NRSROs.
48. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203 §§ 939-939A, 124 Stat 1376 (20lO).
49. Partnoy, supra note 45, at 700-OJ.
50. Richard Cantor et aI., The Use of Credit Ratings in Investment ManagPr
ment in the U.S. and Eurqpe 9-10 (Working Paper, 2007), available at http:/ /
ssm.comlabstract=996133.
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Financial contract counterparties. Private parties to fmandal
contracts often use ratings to control counterparty risk. 51
Downgrades may seIVe as triggers for contract termination, interest rate adjustments, collateral adjustments, or other actions. For example, AIG's contracts with CDS counterparties
called for AIG to post more collateral upon the downgrade of
the relevant reference security, and/or upon the downgrade
of AIG itself. 52 When the rating agencies downgraded AIG in
September 2008, the company calculated it would have to post
$18 billion in additional collateral to its counterparties, likely
pushing it into bankruptcy absent government inteIVention,
all without any actual defaults on the reference instruments
for its credit default swaps. 53
2.

Capital market efficiency

In efficient securities markets, a relatively small number
of arbitrageurs seeking and trading on information can produce a market price for a security with the character of a pulr
lic good: it impounds all relevant public information, and unsophisticated investors can generally buy and sell on the same
terms as the savviest traders. This pricing function helps guide
capital to its most productive uses. To the degree this mechanism holds, it does so primarily in highly liquid secondary markets. 54
Many debt instruments, however, are traded only thinly or
not at all in secondary markets. In these cases, rating agencies
may promote efficient allocation of capital in two respects.
First, where investors could, with some investigation, satisfy
themselves as to a bond's credit quality, reliable ratings prevent duplication of effort among investors. They may also
open the market to investors for whom the cost of investigation would otherwise outweigh a bond's attractiveness relative
to other investments.
51. See MOODY'S, RATING TRIGGERS IN THE AssET MANAGEMENT INDUSTRY
(2008), http://v3.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?dodd=
PBe_113877.

52. Robert O'Harrow Jr. & Brady Dennis, Downgrades and Downfalls,
Dec. 31, 2008, at AI.
53. Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Behind AlG:S- Fall, Risk Models Failed To Pass
Real-World Test, WAll. ST. j., Oct. 31, 2008, at AI.
54. Gorton, Invisihk Hand, supra note 38, at 9-10.

WASH. POST,
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Second, rating agencies can help issuers avoid lemons
markets. 55 If there are obstacles to issuers communicating
high credit quality directly to investors, they may seek to communicate it through a reputational intermediary. Rating agencies may play this role in structured financial products when
investors are unable to assess credit quality due to complexity.
In such a case, the rating agencies may have sophisticated
models for estimating credit risk on which investors might rely.
It is therefore worth briefly outlining rating methodologies for
RMBS and cnos.
B.

Rating mechanics for structured products

To rate both enos and RMBS, the rating agencies employ statistical models in order to determine the expected
losses on collateral pools, and then model the cash flow from
the pool to the tranched securities issued against the pool,56
There is, however, a significant difference in the model inputs
for RMBS as opposed to cnos. RMBS models incorporate a
large number of variables, such as the loan-to-value ratio of the
mortgages, credit scores of the borrowers, debt-to-income ratios of the borrowers, loan seasoning, property type, whether
the mortgage was adjustable- or fixed-rate, and geographic diversification. 57 cno models incorporate just a few variables:
collateral assets' current credit rating, maturity, and asset
type. 58
Based on their models, the rating agencies run a large
number of simulations to generate a probability distribution of
losses on the collateral pool. Three parameter estimates drive
the simulations: collateral default frequencies, recovery rates,
and correlations. 59
The rating agencies have also developed expected default
rates for each rating category and maturity. Table 3 provides
the expected defaults for AAA-rated cnos used by each rat55. See supra Section II.C.4.
56. See Credit Risk Transfer, supra note 2, at 56-58.
57. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, PRELIMINARY STAFF REpORT: CREDIT RATINGS AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 15-16, (2010) [hereinafter CREDIT RATINGS
AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS], http://www.fcic.gov/reports/pdfs/201O-0602Credit-Ratings. pdf.
58. Credit Risk Transfer, supra note 2, at 57.
59. CREDIT RATINGS AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note 57, at 19.
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ings firm, derived from historical data. To illustrate the rating
process in simple terms, imagine that S&P is analyzing and rating a five-year CDO. How large a portion of the CDO will receive a AAA rating? As Table 3 indicates, S&P expects 0.118
percent of structured finance tranches with AAA ratings and
five-year maturities to default. This means it expects such securities to perfonn as promised 99.882 percent of the time.
TABLE

3:

RATING AGENCIES' AAA-RATED EXPECTED DEFAULT
RATES FOR STRUCTURED FINANCE 60
Maturi'1' in Years

All in percent
Fitch Criterion

0.00

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

0.00

0.01

0.02

0.03

0.05

0.08

0.11

0.15

0.19

Moody's
Criterion

0.0001 0.0002 0.0007 0.0018 0.0029 0.0040 0.0052 0.0066 0.0082 0.0100

S&P Criterion

0.000

0.009

0.030

0.065

0.118

0.190

0.285

0.405

0.552

0.728

Source: John M. Griffin and Dragon Tang, Did Subjectivity Play a Rok in CDO Credit Ratings?

S&P will then refer to the probability distribution of losses
its model simulations have generated to determine the AAA
tranche size. If, for example, expected losses will exceed $2
million in a $10 million dollar deal just 0.118 percent of the
time, then the AAA tranche size of the deal will be $8 million
($10 million - $2 million). The same process informs the ratings for each tranche.
IV.
THE PROBLEM

A.
1.

The problem with CDOs

Increased sensitivity

Structured finance CDOs were constructed from the
lower tranches of "first-level" securitizations, with portfolios
dominated by subprime RMBS.61 For subprime RMBS, the
principal of the BBB-rated tranches would typically begin taking losses when pool losses exceeded roughly six percent, and
would be completely wiped out when pool losses reached ap60. Fitch and Moody's refer to these figures as "idealized default
probabilities," while S&P refers to them as the expected default rates, but
they serve the same function. Griffin & Tang, supra note 13, at 69 tbi. AI.
61. Credit Risk Transfer, supra note 2, at 5.
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proximately 9.5 percent. 62 BBB-rated RMBS tranches backed
by Alt-A mortgages would typically take losses when the collateral pool losses reached roughly four percent, and would be
wiped out at around five percent. 63
The rating agency models that assigned AAA ratings to
such large portions of ABS CDOs assumed that defaults were
not highly correlated across the mezzanine RMBS tranches
that ultimately backed the CDOs.64 The problem with this assumption is that the probability of default and default correlations on consumer loans can rise sharply with macroeconomic
shocks. Raghuram Rajan, describing building risks in the financial system several years before the crisis, obselV'ed that
"correlations that are zero or negative in normal times can
turn overnight to one" and that as a result "[a] hedged position can become unhedged at the worst times, inflicting substantial losses on those who mistakenly believe they are protected."65 As applied to CDOs, low levels of default correlation
for underlying collateral securities protect the senior tranches
in normal times. As default correlations rise in a recession,
however, the senior tranches become vulnerable. What matters for these senior tranches is not the "average comovement"
of assets, but the "worst-case comovement."fifi As Coval et al.
explain, "the securitization process ... substitutes risks that are
largely diversifiable for risks that are highly systematic. [Such
securities] have far less chance of surviving a severe economic
downturn than traditional corporate securities of equal rating."67
With respect to mortgages and consumer debt - the foundation of structured finance - job losses and falling asset
prices can lead to systematically higher levels of default. Depending on the severity of the downturn, the systematically
62. Ashcraft et aI., supra note 23, at tbl. 1.
63. Id.
64. Note that any RMBS tranche below AAA is considered mezzanine;
the fact that CD Os built primarily from AA and A mezzanine tranches were
called "high grade" reflecL<; a degree of marketing.
65. Raghuram Raj an , Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?
338 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. Wll728, 2005),
available at http://www.kansascityfed.org/Publicat/sympos/2005/PDF /Ra
jan2005.pdf.
66. Cudit Risk Transfer, supra note 2, at 17-18.
67. Coval et aI., supra note 30, at 4.

Imaged with Permission ofN.Y.U. Journal of Law & Business

24

NYU JOURNAL OF LAW & BUSINESS

[Vol. 7:1

higher default levels may have a small or even no impact on
senior tranches of first-level securitizations such as RMBS,
since senior tranches draw cash flow from the entire collateral
pool in priority to the lower tranches. This protection of the
senior tranches comes at the expense of the junior tranches,
potentially using up the bulk of the cash flow from non-defaulting mortgages. Consequently, a severe downturn will have
a disproportionately large impact on mezzanine tranches of
RMBS. Because CDOs are built from these mezzanine
tranches, a rise in defaults that does not affect AAA-rated
RMBS tranches could completely wipe out an entire CDO
pool, including the AAA-rated tranches.
Robert Pozen provides a stylized illustration of this dynamic in his book Too Big To Save?68 Imagine 100 bonds of a
dollar each are issued against a pool of 100 mortgages, and
that each mortgage pays a dollar 95 percent of the time and
nothing five percent of the time. Assume their performance is
not correlated. The bonds are tranched and numbered so that
smaller numbers are at the bottom of the tranche hierarchy.
Thus, tranche 1, the riskiest tranche, defaults if any mortgage
defaults, and tranche 100, the safest tranche, defaults only if
every single mortgage defaults. Now assume there are 100
identical RMBS, and tranche 10 from each is pooled into a
CDO, with an identical structure to the RMBS. Figure 5 illustrates this structure.
In this hierarchy, tranche 10 of each RMBS defaults 2.82
percent of the time (lower than that of any individual mortgage) .69 Assuming no correlation among tranche performances across RMBS, Tranche 10 of the CDO, in tum, has a
default probability of 0.05 percent.
Imagine now that there is a slight downturn that causes
the default rate of underlying mortgages to rise from 5 percent to 6 percent. Because the downturn is widespread, this
increase is correlated across all the RMBS, so that each pool
has expected losses of 6 percent. As shown in Table 4, the
probability of default will rise from 2.82 percent to 7.75 percent for each RMBS tranche 10, but will increase from 0.05
68. ROBERT rOZEN, Too BIG To SAVE? 95-96 (2010). The example is
based on a presentation given by Coval et aI.
69. This can be computed by the cumulative binomial distribution function. See supra note 34.
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FIGURE

5:
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percent to 24.71 percent for the CDO tranche 10. If the downturn is a bit worse, and mortgage default rates jump to 7 percent everywhere, the default probability will rise to 16.2 percent for the RMBS tranche 10 and to 97.19 percent for the
CDO tranche 10.
TABLE

4:

SENSITIVITY OF

RMBS

AND

CDO

CHANGES IN

UNDERLYING DEFAULT PROBABILITIES

Probability of default across all
underlying mortgages:

5%
(baseline
scenario)

6%

7%

Probability of default for tranche
10 of the RMBS:

2.82%

7.75%

16.2%

Probability of default for tranche
10 of the CDO:

0.05%

24.71%

97.19%

I

Small baseline errors in the estimation of default risk and
correlation can thus have an outsize impact on the second
level of securitization. As Coval et al. argue, high ratings for
second-level securities were justified only "if the rating agencies were extraordinarily confident about their ability to estimate the underlying securities' default risks, and how likely defaults were to be correlated."70
70. Coval et aI., supra note 30, at 3.
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We should expect, then, that as the housing market deteriorated, senior tranches of CDOs backed by mezzanine RMBS
tranches would wind up performing significantly worse than
the senior tranches of RMBS themselves.
2.

Actual performance

Mortgage-backed CDOs did, in fact, perform worse than
RMBS during the crisis. While many RMBS tranches were
downgraded, relatively few of the most highly rated tranches
have suffered impairment. 71 For example, by the end of 2008,
among the 200frvintage RMBS backed by subprime first-lien
mortgages, only 0.1 percent of Moody's AAA-rated tranches
had been impaired (by volume), whereas 40.1 percent of AArated tranches, 82 percent of A-rated tranches, and 97 percent
of BBB-rated tranches had suffered impairment. 72 Similarly,
among 200frvintage Alt-A RMBS, 0.0 percent of AAA-rated
tranches had been impaired by year-end 2008 (by volume),
while 13.4 percent of AA-rated tranches, 60.1 percent of Arated tranches, and 83.3 percent of BBB-rated tranches had
suffered impairment. 73
In contrast, 100 percent of Moody's AAA-rated high-grade
ABS CDOs issued in 2006 had suffered impairment by the end
of 2008, as had more than half of the 2006-vintage AAA-rated
71. Impairment can refer to a shortfall in interest or in principal, defined as a rating of Ca (in or very near default) or C (in default with little
prospect for recovery of principal or interest). SeeJULIA TUNG, MOODY'S, DEFAULT & Loss RATES OF STRUCJ1JRED FINANCE SECURITIES: 1993-2008, 3
(2009) [hereinafter MOODY'S, DEFAULT & Loss RATES 1993-2008]. Impairment is a surer gauge of credit performance than rating downgrades, given
that "the accuracy of credit ratings is highly questionable and downgrades
may not translate into actual losses." Barnett-Hart, supra note 9, at 35.
72. MOODY'S, DEFAULT & Loss RATES 1993-2008, supra note 71, at 12 ex.
16. As noted above, Moody's notation differs slightly: Aaa is equivalent to
AAA, and Baa is equivalent to BBB. For 2005-2007 vintage RMBS (not disaggregated by individual year), Moody's has reported the following impairment rates, as a percentage of the dollar-volume of issuances, as of year-end
2009. For RMBS backed by Alt-A mortgages, 9.9 percent of AAA, 83.3 percent of AA, 92.4 percent of A, and 96.5 percent of BBB tranches have been
impaired. For RMBS backed by subprime first-lien mortgages, 4.4 percent of
AAA, 52.1 percent of AA, 75.9 percent of A, and 95.5 percent of BBB
tranches have been impaired. JULIA TUNG, MOODYS, DEFAULT & Loss RATES
OF STRUCJ1JRED FINANCE SECURITIES: 1993-2009, 13 (2010) [hereinafter
MOODY'S, DEFAULT & Loss RATES 1993-2009].
73. MOODY'S, DEFAULT & Loss RATES 1993-2009, supra note 72, at 13.
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mezz ABS CDOs. This latter figure topped 90 percent by the
end of the first quarter of 2009. 74 (The reason the impairment
rate of high-grade CDO senior bonds was higher than for mezz
CDO senior bonds is that the AAA-rated tranches of highgrade CDOs typically constituted more than 90 percent of the
securitization, whereas the AAA-rated tranches of mezz CDOs
typically made up 75-80 percent of the deal value. 75 )
This is consistent with the expectations outlined above. As
mortgage defaults rose, principal impairments climbed a little
bit up the tranche ladder of RMBS, and very high up the
tranche ladder of most CDOs.
3.

Regulatory arbitrage and hidden risk-taking

I argued earlier that of the market imperfections that
structured finance might address, market segmentation and
market incompleteness provided possible rationales for CDOs.
But there was another likely motivation to the construction of
CDOs: regulatory arbitrage. Some commentators believe that
the principal use to which structured products were put in the
years leading up to the crisis was to allow regulated institutions
to assume more risk than they would otherwise be allowed to
take. 76 There was, first, skepticism that rating agencies could
accurately capture the risk in RMBS mortgage pools when assigning ratings. 77 The more common criticisms arise, however,
at the CDO level. Critics have, for example, homed in on the
well-documented lag in rating migrations and the reliance on
RMBS ratings in setting default probabilities when modeling
CDOS.78 In other words, an RMBS tranche might carry a rating
of BBB for an extended period after it becomes clear that its
credit quality has deteriorated to 'Junk." A CDO may be able
to buy such a bond at a discount, but use the BBB default assumptions when creating and obtaining ratings for its own
AAA tranche. This means that the AAA tranche will be rated
based not only without due regard to the risk of correlated
74. CREDIT RATINGS AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note 57, at 32, 47.
75. See Credit Risk Transfer, supra note 2, at 53.
76. See, e.g., Pannoy, supra note 2, at 11-12; Roubini, supra note 3.
77. See Joseph R. Mason & Joshua Rosner, Where Did the Risk Go? How
MisajJjJlied Bond Rntings Cause Mortgage Backed Securities and Collateralized Debt
Obligation Market Disruptions 3 (Working Paper May 14, 2007), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=1027475.
78. See Partnoy, supra note 2, at 4, 8-9.
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default, but also with unrealistic assumptions about individual
RMBS tranches that comprise the CDO. Such CDOs have a
high level of risk but a "super safe" imprimatur from rating
agencies. Because these bonds generally offered a premium
over other AAA-rated bonds,79 they were attractive to regulated fund managers who wanted to increase their yield, and
were happy to increase their risk levels to do so, without running afoul of contractual requirements or regulatory restrictions. Their risk level complied with the letter but not the
spirit of these restrictions.
This explanation of hidden risk relies on malfeasance or
incompetence by the rating agencies and other market actors.
There is, however, a more fundamental type of hidden risk
that CD Os facilitated: "tail risk." This refers to the distribution
of likely outcomes for senior CDO tranches: perfect performance under most macroeconomic scenarios, and large losses in
a crisis (the "tail" of the distribution). Coval et al. describe
CDOs as economic catastrophe bonds for this reason. so As
Rajan explains in relation to CDS, these sorts of "tail risks . . .
produce a positive return most of the time as compensation
for a rare very negative return. "S1 Because these sorts of investments display low volatility over extended periods, a portfolio
of them can appear to "produc[e] very high alphas (high returns for low risk), so managers have an incentive to load up
on them. Every once in a while, however, they will blow up.
Since true performance can only be estimated over a longer
period, far exceeding the horizon set by the average manager's incentives, managers will take these risks if they can."S2
High CDO ratings facilitated this risk-taking.
While implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act will likely
remove many of the incentives for regulatory arbitrage by reducing or eliminating regulatory reliance on ratings, the potential for the risk-hiding use of ratings will persist as long as
ratings are used by investment funds as a contractual mecha79. See MOODY'S, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PAR COUPON SPREADS AND
CREDIT RATINGS IN US STRUcruRED FINANCE 1 (2005).
80. Coval et aI., Economic Catastrophe Bonds, 99 AMER. ECON. REv. 628, 628
(2009), available at http://pubs.aeaweb.org/ doi/pdfplus/1 0.1257 /aer.99.3.
628.
81. Rajan, supra note 65, at 20.

82. Id.
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nism to restrict excessive risk-taking, and as long as they are
used as a benchmark for comparing fund performance.

B.

The crisis

The most obvious contribution of CDOs to the crisis was
that they contributed an outsize percentage of losses to key
financial institutions. One empirical study showed that the
best predictor of bank write-downs during the crisis was "the
amount of CDOs they issued in 2007, for very few of these
CDOs would ever leave the balance sheets of their creators."83
Financial institution losses, however, wound up being
many times larger than actual default losses, leading to
bailouts, emergency sales, and bankruptcy. The most cogent
explanation of how this occurred views the crux of the crisis as
a type of bank run. 84

1.

The run

The financial crisis was structurally similar to a classic
bank run, but in the "shadow" banking system rather than the
traditional banking system. 85 A run involves an unexpected demand for redemption of a bank's liabilities. Because these liabilities tend to be short-term (e.g., demand deposit accounts),
banks are obliged to comply with these demands. The bank's
assets, however, tend to involve long-term commitments (e.g.,
mortgages); the bank cannot call in these loans in order to pay
off its depositors. A bank's assets might exceed its liabilities at
the beginning of a run, but if it is forced to sell long-term assets into illiquid markets, where prices reflect not fundamentals but banks' desperate need for cash ("fire sales"), a run
could cause major losses and even push the bank into insolvency.

83. Barnett-Hart, supra note 9, at 96.
84. See generally Gorton, Invisible Hand, supra note 38. This explanation of
the crisis draws heavily on Gorton's account.
85. The "shadow" banking system loosely refers to financing functions
that were removed from the regulatory framework and restrictions of commercial banking over the past decades.
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The problem of commercial bank runs was largely solved
with the introduction of deposit insurance in 1934. 86 Firms or
funds with large short-term cash surpluses, however, cannot
rely on deposit insurance, as their surplus is usually orders of
magnitude larger than the FDIC's individual account insurance cap.87 Instead, they regularly "deposit" their money with
another financial institution, and receive collateral in return,
in a repurchase, or "repo," agreement. 88 These agreements
were an efficient way for financial institutions on the other
side of the transaction to fund their short-term cash needs.
Repo agreements are generally for a single night, but may be
rolled over indefinitely by the parties. In this respect they function very much like demand deposits - the depositor can withdraw its money at any point. The repo market had grown immense prior to the crisis - it is estimated to have been as large
$12 trillion, roughly the same size as the commercial banking
system. 89
The key to the repo market was the perception of collateral as "safe."90 There was thus a huge demand for "safe" collateral to facilitate this market - a demand that could not be
met by government bonds or by the shrinking ranks of AAArated industrial firms.91 As indicated above, this demand was a
primary driver of the structured finance market, and particularly the creation of AAA-rated "second-level" bonds from
lower-rated bonds.
In the repo market, a "depositor" (say, a money-market
mutual fund) wanted to "deposit" its excess cash in a risk-free
86. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., A BRIEF HISTORY OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE
IN THE UNITED STATES 25-28,(1998), http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historicaIl
brief/brhist.pdf.
87. The cap was $100,000 leading up to the crisis, and has since been
raised to $250,000. See Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Basic FDIC Ins.
Coverage Permanently Increased to $250,000 Per Depositor Guly 21, 2010),
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2010/prl0161.html.
88. Gorton, Invisible Hand, supra note 38, at 4.
89. Gary Gorton, Questions and Answers About the Financial Crisis 10 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15787, 2010) [hereinafter
Gorton, Questions and Answers) (prepared for the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstracc
id=1557279.
90. Gorton refers to such debt as "informationally insensitive." Gorton,
Invisible Hand, supra note 38, at 4.
91. See Caballero, supra note 37, at 14-15.
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vehicle. It did not want to worry about the solvency of the
"bank" (say, Bear Steams) or the value of collateral the bank
was providing. In trusting the value of the collateral, depositors relied not on federal insurance, but on rating agencies'
assurance. Sophisticated investors may have been skeptical
about the precision of ratings as one moved down the rating
scale, and indeed AAA ratings did not demand uniform interest rates,92 but there appears to have been a widely accepted
belief in financial _markets that the AAA rating equaled
safety.93
When it became clear that housing prices were going to
fall, the market lost faith in ratings on mortgage-backed securities. 94 Further, market actors knew it was unlikely that credit
rating migrations incorporating this new information would
be timely, and it started to become clear that AAA-rated CDO
tranches might actually default in the near term.
As the market lost faith in the AAA ratings of mortgagebacked securities and CDOs, the repo market came under increasing strain. Depositors either refused to roll over their
funds, meaning they withdrew their "deposits," or they demanded a higher "haircut" on the collateral, meaning more
bonds per dollar of "deposit."95 The average haircut on structured finance products jumped from zero in mid-2007 to
roughly 10 percent by the end of 2007, and close to 50 percent
by the end of 2008. 96 This amounted to a massive withdrawal
92. This was due to a number of factors. First, a single CDO often contained two (or more) AAA tranches, one junior and one senior, so that the
riskier, junior tranche would receive a higher coupon. Second, there were
many types of risk other than credit risk that inform a security's price. See
STANDARD

&

POOR'S, FUNDAMENTALS OF STRUCTURED FINANCE RATINGS,

supra

note 12, at 6. Finally, to the degree that rating agencies were too generous
giving AAA ratings to eDOs and the market realized it, investors may have
demanded a slight risk premium. These factors may appear to be in tension
with the view that AAA ratings equaled safety, but it is possible that there was
a sense that securities had to be "safe enough" rather than uniformly safe to
be used as collateral, and the AAA rating was a powerful mnemonic threshold for a security's qualifying "safe enough."
93. See Credit Risk Transfer, supra note 2, at 13-14.
94. See Gorton, Subprime Panic, supra note 18, at 20-26.
95. The "haircut" refers to the percentage difference between the face
value of the collateral and the loan size in a repo agreement. 1£ the face
value of the collateral is $100, and the loan is $95, the haircut is 5 percent.
96. Gorton, Invisibk Hand, supra note 38, at 33.
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from the repo system, as assets that once collateralized, say,
$100 million in short-term funding for a shadow bank now
supported only a fraction of that amount. Liquid assets were
drained from the institutions that played the role of the bank.
It was the functional equivalent of a bank run.
Financial institutions were forced to sell assets to meet
repo "withdrawals." Many observers believe that because most
prospective buyers were in the same position, market prices
collapsed, and securities were sold at fire-sale prices. 97 Because
of mark-to-market accounting rules, this in turn depressed the
value of other balance sheet assets, which for regulated financial institutions reduced capital ratios below regulatory requirements and forced further sales, creating a vicious cycle of
value destruction.
2.

The role of structured products

The market lost faith in structured product ratings for two
reasons: first, it became clear that the subprime collateral was
not worth as much as the face value of the RMBS and enos,
and, second, there was profound opacity about where the
losses were located. 98
enos are more blameworthy than RMBS on both counts.
As explained above, AAA-rated tranches of RMBS - the
tranches most relevant as collateral - have suffered relatively
few impairments relative to AAA-rated tranches of enos
(though they have been downgraded and suffered mark-tomarket losses). Second, enos were more opaque to the market. Unlike RMBS, which were largely standardized, enos
tended to be custom-built. Each had to be modeled separately.99 Further, while some RMBS were publicly offered,
enos were exclusively privately placed, and it was harder to
get reliable information on them. lOO
enos were further culpable because without them, it is
unlikely that the RMBS market would have grown to the extent it did, which arguably encouraged mortgage originators
See, e.g., Gorton, Subprime Panic, supra note 18.
See id. at 26-27.
Id. at 14.
See Richard Tomlinson & David Evans, TJw &lings Charade, BLOOMMARKETS, July 2007, at 53, availohle at http://www.streetfortreasurer.

97.
98.
99.
100.
BERG

com/articles/Ol-072007-Toxic-Debt.pdf.
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to push into riskier customer markets, sometimes taking steps
to mask the risk. Without COOs to buy up the lower-rated
tranches of subprime RMBS, it is likely that many RMBS deals
would never have successfully gone through. Wi
As a final note on COOs' role in increasing systemic risk, a
huge part of the problem going into the crisis was insufficient
capitalization at banks.lo2 The effects of the shadow bank run
described above were more severe because banks were so
thinly capitalized. Many banks used the securitization process,
and COOs specifically, to lower their capital ratio while meeting regulatory requirements. 109 They could do this by repackaging lower-rated securities into COOs or COO-squareds and
holding them. Because banks were required to hold less capital against AAA-rated securities than other assets, and because
the majority of each repackaged COO was rated AAA, the total
amount of bank capital required to support the identical underlying assets was less than before. 104
While the crisis had a variety of interrelated causes, the
role of COOs and COO ratings was significant.
V.
PROPOSED REFORM

A.

1.

Ratings ceiling

The proposal

I have attempted to explain how structured finance CD Os
are vulnerable to large systemic shocks, wherein the "worstcase" co-movement of underlying assets can wipe out the lower
tranches of first-level securitizations, and thus the entire structure of second-level securitizations. This vulnerability to systemic risk, abetted by high ratings, was a key causal factor in
the crisis.
The market has taken care of this problem for the time
being, as structured finance CDO issuance has collapsed since
101. See Mason & Rosner, supra note 77, at 69-72 (describing the reliance
of RMBS markets on eDOs for the sale of mezzanine tranches).
102. Arnold Kling, Not What They Had in Mind: A History of Policies That
Produced the Financial Crisis of 2008 6 (Mercatus Fin. Mkts. Working Grp.,
Working Paper No. 1474430, 2009), availahk at http://papers.ssm.com/
5013/ papers.cfm?abstracUd=14 74430.
103. See id. at 68.
104. See id.
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the crisiS.105 We cannot, however, rely on the market to selfregulate during the next period of market euphoria. In bubble
conditions, not just issuers but investors push against the conservatism of gatekeepers such as rating agencies. 106
Many commentators question whether the benefits of
CDOs outweigh the costs.107 A possible implication of this is
that CDOs should be banned. lOB I believe that another approach may salvage any net-positive economic function CDOs
may serve, while at the same time removing or severely limiting market actors' ability to employ CD Os to hide risk during
periods of economic growth. This approach would place strict
limits on the rating of any individual tranche of a CDO. It
would apply to any re-securitization; in other words, to any
structured product that has as collateral other structured products (mortgage-backed or asset-backed securities, or other
CDOs), or derivatives referencing those products (such as
CDSs). It would still be possible to tranche second-level securi105. See SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. AsS'N (SIFMA), GLOBAL CDO ISSUANCE,
http://www.sifma.org/research/research.aspx?ID=10806 (follow "Global
CDO Issuance" hyperlink).
106. See, e.g., JOHN COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS 56 (2006) (explaining with
respect to the role of accounting firms that "[i]n a bubble, investors lose
their skepticism . . . . In this atmosphere of market euphoria, gatekeepers
become irrelevant - or, even worse, share holden; reinforce the pressure on
them for the use of risky and/or improper accounting policies in order to
sustain hyperbolic earnings growth.").
107. See, e.g., Robert E. Litan, In Defense of Much, but Not All, Financial Innovation 35 (Brookings Inst., Working Paper, 2010), available at http://www.
brookings.edul - /media/Filesl rei opinions/20 10/0217_financiaUnnova
tion_litan/0217_financiaUnnovation_litan.pdf (stating that "it is difficult to
imagine a more destructive financial innovation" than the CDO); Alan Murray, Paul Volcl~er: Think More Broadly, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2009, at R.7,
available at http://online.wsj.com/ artide/NA_WSJ]UB:SB10001424052748
704825504574586330960597134.html ("[TJhe economy was rising very
nicely in the 1950s and 1960s without all of these innovations. Indeed, it was
quite good in the 1980s without credit-default swaps and without securitization and without CDOs. I do not know if something happened that suddenly
made these innovations essential for growth. In fact, we had greater speed of
growth and particulady did not put the whole economy at risk of collapse.").
108. JEROME S. FONs, FONS RISK SOLUTIONS, WHITE PAPER ON RATING COMPETITION AND STRUCTURED FINANCE 12 (2008), available at http://www.fons
l;sksolutions.com/Documents/Ratings%20White%20Paper.pdf ("Even if
market forces do not render them extinct going forward, the rating of complex structures should be avoided or prohibited."); Roubini, supra note 3.
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tizations, but ratings would no longer help hide the vulnerability of senior COO tranches to systemic shocks.
There are several approaches one could take to implementing these limits, including an outright ban on the highest
rating categories for COOs - forbidding, for example, any
COO tranche, however senior, to receive a rating of AAA and
AA. Another approach would be to limit COO ratings to the
weighted average rating of the underlying collateral. In this
case, the prudent course would be for the weighted average
rating of the entire pool of assets to set the ceiling for the senior-most tranche of the COO. Any approach that would allow
the rating of the senior tranche to be greater than the
weighted average of the entire underlying pool could invite
arbitrage and risk-hiding during the next period of market euphoria.
A potential complication for this approach is that default
probabilities do not climb linearly as one descends the rating
scale. Table 5 illustrates this with historical default rates for
Fitch. As one drops from AAA to AA+ (a one-notch drop), the
annualized default rate climbs 0.04 percentage points, from
0.02 percent to 0.06 percent. As one falls from CCC to CC (another one-notch drop), however, the annualized default rate
climbs more than eight percentage points, from 6.64 percent
to 14.70 percent. The weighting should, therefore, be based
on expected default probabilities, and not on linear numerical
weighting of ratings notches.
Rating agencies already provide expected default
probabilities for each rating, and Dodd-Frank ensures that this
will continue by requiring them to do SO.109
To illustrate the difference between the two approaches
to calculating the weighted average rating, consider how we
would compute this rating for a pool of two one-year bonds
with equal face value: one a AAA bond with a default
probability of 0.02 percent, and one a BB- bond with a default
probability of 2.04 percent. If we counted the rating notches
between the two and picked the rating mid-way between them,
the result would A- (which otherwise would have a one-year
default probability of 0.25 percent). If, on the other hand, we
109. 15 U.S.C. § 780-7 (s)(3) (B) (ii) (II) (West 2006); Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. ] 11-203
§ 932(a)(8), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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computed the average of the two default probabilities, we
would get 1.03 percent; we could then find the rating whose
default probability most closely matched this, rounding up (as
rounding down could invite further arbitrage). In this case,
that would be BB+, with a one-year expected default
probability of 1.07 percent.
Another approach would weigh average expected loss
rates rather than default probabilities. This may be preferable
to the degree we expect a large variance in the amount of
losses given default.
Finally, it would be possible to limit the size of any
tranche with a given rating to the value of the underlying collateral with an identical rating. Thus, if AAA-rated bonds made
up five percent of the value of the collateral of a CDO, the
CDO could issue a AAA-rated tranche not exceeding five percent of the deal value.
These are admittedly blunt tools, but they have the advantage of providing clear guidelines that would be relatively resistant to a slippage in standards during the next bubble. Most
importantly, they would prevent the creation of second-level
securitizations aimed at creating apparently "safe" debt out of
riskier debt. They would force raters to treat the worst-case comovement of junior first-level bonds as what matters. The wisdom of restricting ratings in such a manner, of course, rests on
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a judgment that the range of beneficial uses of CDOs is likely
very narrow.
2.

Potential concerns

What do we give up with a CDO rating ceiling?
What might be lost with this approach? Here we may
hearken back to the market failures to which, I argue, CD Os
may respond. First, there is the creation of "safe" AAA-rated
debt to serve a market that places a premium on it. A CDO
rating ceiling would significantly impede this function. This
should not cause us regret, however, as second-level securitizations that serve this purpose are likely to prove less-than-safe at
precisely the moment they are most needed: during a crisis.
The other market imperfection to which CDOs may respond is market incompleteness. Our approach would do
nothing directly to impede this response, as ratings are not
necessary to any market-completing function CDOs may serve.
On the other hand, it is possible that high ratings were necessary for CDO issuance for other reasons, and that a byproduct
of CDO creation was completing certain markets. If this is the
case, it will be a loss, but one that is probably worth bearing in
return for reduced systemic risk.
Would the First Amendment impede a mandatory ceiling?
First Amendment concerns may prevent the direct imposition of a rating ceiling on NRSROs, but it would be possible to
achieve the same end by regulating the sale of CDOs.IIO For
example, if the rule were that CDO ratings cannot exceed the
weighted average of the collateral ratings, the SEC could forbid the sale of any structured finance CDO 111 that has received
a rating for which the issuer has paid that exceeds this average.
Unsolicited ratings for CDOs require information that is not
110. See, e.g., Letter from Eugene Volokh, Professor, UCLA Sch. of Law,
to Members of the House of Representatives Fin. Servo Comm. (May 15,
2009), at 9, available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financial

svcs_dem/volokh .pdf (explaining that despite First Amendment obstacles
to "direct regulation of agency evaluations ... , Congress could. . . require
that various commercial transactions. . . be accompanied with reports that
comply with certain guidelines").
1] 1. Defined as a securitization that includes, or, in the case of managed
CDOs, can include in its collateral pool any structured product.

Imaged with Permission ofN.Y.U. Journal of Law & Business

38

NYU JOURNAL OF LAW & BUSINESS

[Vol. 7:1

publicly available; as described below,1l2 the SEe now requires
that such information be made available to other rating agencies on a password-protected website. The SEe could further
require that any rating agency availing itself of this information agree not to assign a rating to a eno greater than the
weighted average of its collateral.

Could issuers replicate the effects of a CDO at the first level of
securitization?
One possible question is whether issuers and rating agencies could reproduce the effect of the eno market through
first-level securitizations. In theory they could, but doing so
would likely have to rest on either (a) enormous collateral
pools that would be very costly and difficult to assemble, or (b)
parameter assumptions so cynically unrealistic that they would
invite a harsh regulatory and market response.
In considering this question, we should remind ourselves
of what structured finance enos did: they pooled junior
RMBS tranches, and against this pool they issued new securities, a very high percentage of which were AAA. The first level
of securitization turned 80 percent of the dollar value of risky
mortgages into AAA bonds. The second level took tranches
from the bottom 20 percent, and turned 80-90 percent of
these tranches into AAA bonds. Mter two rounds of securitization, $100 million worth of subprime mortgages might support
more than $97 million worth of AAA bonds,l13 With repeated
rounds of securitization,114 the value of AAA bonds based on a
pool of mortgages could asymptotically approach the face
value of the underlying mortgages. Indeed, the value of the
AAA bonds could exceed the value of the underlying mortgages, as enos were built in part from credit default swaps
that referenced particular RMBS tranches. 115
The eno process relied on assumptions about imperl'ect
correlation in the credit perl'ormance of mezzanine tranches
of a wide array of first-level securitizations. One could imagine
112. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., Gorton, Subprime Panic, supra note 18, at 13 (showing tranche
size by rating as a percentage of deal size in typical subprime RMBS and
Mezz eno deals).
114. See Barnett-Hart, supra note 9, at 29.
115. See Credit Risk Transfer, supra note 2, at 5.
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that instead of, say, 100 RMBS and one cno, one could construct a single giant RMBS and, using the correlation assumptions that informed the cno, assign AAA ratings to a tranche
or tranches making up, say, 97 percent instead of 81 percent
of the entire deal structure. The problem with this is that the
correlation assumptions about the mezzanine tranches, to the
degree they were at all plausible, rely on types of risk diversification that would be very hard to achieve with one securitization, particularly diversification across vintages (e.g., RMBS
tranches of different origination date). Diversification across
underwriters would also be more difficult to achieve, though
this might be partially offset if the deal were syndicated. With
or without this diversification, the warehousing risk of building
a first-level asset-backed security of this size would be extremely large. enos were typically built from more than 100
securities,116 so the warehousing risk associated with building a
giant first-level security to mimic the eno market would likely
be roughly two orders of magnitude greater than the risk associated with any single RMBS deal. In the sample of more than
3,000 RMBS discussed above,117 the average deal size was $896
million for subprime-backed RMBS, and $595 million for
RMBS backed by Alt-A mortgages. I IS The warehousing risk for
a monster RMBS, then, could be in the tens of billions of dollars. This would make it a significantly more costly and less
attractive venture, even to a consortium of underwriters.
If, on the other hand, rating agencies relaxed their parameter assumptions and assigned AAA ratings to a much
higher percentage of a typical RMBS deal, it would relatively
clear that the agency had eschewed any aspirations toward
quality, and much easier for the market and regulators to respond in real time. First-level securitizations, while complex,
are significantly more transparent than enos, and it would be
much more difficult for the rating agencies to justifY assigning
AAA ratings to, say, 97 percent of a subprime RMBS issuance.
Again, part of the reason that AAA-rated eno tranches were
attractive was that they hid risk.
In any event, first-level securitizations have a clear economic rationale; they will continue to be rated, and it is usually
116. Barnett-Hart, supra note 9, at 106.
117. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
118. Ashcraft et al., supra note 23, at thl. 1.
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justifiable for a substantial portion of each such securitization
to receive the highest rating. It is better to try to encourage
quality ratings for these instruments in other ways. The rationale for eDOs is weaker, and their sensitivity to parameter assumptions significantly greater. For eDOs, a hard and fast rule
makes more sense.
Is a rating ceiling needed given other reforms?

A final key question is whether this reform is needed,
given the many reforms affecting rating agencies in the DoddFrank Act, earlier SEC rule changes, and other reform proposals put forward by critics. Below I explain why a rating cap for
structured finance eDOs is a useful supplement to the other
reforms, proposed or enacted.

B.

Other proposals

A number of credit rating agency reforms have been enacted, and others proposed, since the onset of the crisis. These
reforms address important flaws in the ratings process, some
of which exacerbated overly optimistic ratings in structured finance, but none targets the specific problem of eDOs. Here I
briefly discuss credit rating reform efforts categorized by the
perceived problems they attempt to address.
1.

Conflict of interest

The majority of proposals and reform efforts have focused
on the conflict of interest inherent in the rating agencies' business model: the agencies are paid by the firms whose bonds
they rate.n 9 Issuers want to see higher ratings for their bonds
as it lowers their cost of capital,120 and may exert pressure on
rating agencies to inflate their ratings. Credit rating agencies'
reputational concerns should, theoretically, steel them against
such pressure, but the drive to expand market share and to
119. See, e.g., SUMMARY REpORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN TIlE COMMISSION
STAFF'S EXAMINATION OF SELECT CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 23 (July 2008),
http://www.sec.gov/ news/ studies/2008/ craexamination070808. pdf.
120. It may do so in two ways. First, buyers may believe the rating, perceive
lower credit risk, and pay more for the bonds. Second, regardless of whether
they believe the rating or not, higher ratings may, at certain trip points, expand the market to institutions that face rating-based holding and capital
requirements.
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generate short-term profits may trump longer-term reputational concerns. 121
There are two principal types of reform that aim to address this conflict of interest. First, some reforms try to
counteract the effects of the conflict by increasing the cost of
inaccuracy, particularly through increasing rating agencies' exposure to liability.122 Second, some proposed reforms would
eliminate the conflict by changing the rating agency business
model.I 23 While addressing the rating agencies' conflict of interest is important, and some of these reforms may be worth
implementing, they are insufficient as a response to the COO
problem this paper has outlined. Our concern is to prevent
the explosion of COOs during the next asset bubble; decades
of steady performance in a given ABS class could reduce wariness about a shock or a "worst-case" scenario, and goodfaith
(rather than venal) assumptions that prove slightly off about
default probabilities and correlations could again have disastrous consequences for senior bonds at the second level of
securitization. Addressing the conflict of interest will not prevent this, but a limit on COO ratings could.
2.

Regulatory licensing

Perhaps the most profound reform enacted by OoddFrank is the immediate removal of references to rating agencies from a number of federal laws, and its prescription that
federal agencies remove regulatory references to ratings
within 12 months. 124 This jibes with a view held by some critics
that rating agencies' primary function is to provide regulatory
121. See FONS, supra note lOB, at 2 ("It is argued that building a stellar
reputation requires a long-tenn horizon and view. Yet managers of publicly
owned rating agencies are subject to intense short-tenn pressure to demonstrate earnings growth. It takes tremendous discipline to turn away business,
particularly when competitors are building market share.").
122. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 7Bu-4 (West 2006); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Refonn and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 933(b) (2010)
(lowering the scienter element of the pleading standard against rating agencies in private securities fraud cases).
123. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Refonn and Consumer Protection
Act § 939F (2010). This provision directs the SEC to study the feasibility of
setting up a clearinghouse that would receive payments from issuers, and
channel assignments and payments randomly to pre-selected ratings agencies.
124. [d. § 939A.
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licenses, not to seIVe as reputational intermediaries. 125 Because ratings have been used so heavily in regulation to prescribe what investors may hold, issuers have had to hire the
rating agencies in order to sell their debt, regardless of the
informational content of ratings. If this view is correct, reforms
that assume the continued use of ratings in regulation are a
waste of time. Stripping references to the rating agencies from
laws and regulations is necessary to force rating agencies to
function legitimately as reputational intermediaries or to die.
If investors do not trust rating agencies, and have no regulations to try to game, they will not pay a premium for bonds
rated by the agencies, and issuers will see no reason to hire
them in the first place. This, in tum, will make rating agencies
guard their reputations much more jealously.
While Dodd-Frank gready reduces regulatory reliance on
ratings, issuers and investors will likely continue to have incentives to push for or wink at inflated ratings, for several reasons.
First, many state regulators will continue to rely on ratings.
Second, even if, for example, money market mutual funds no
longer have to refer to ratings to determine their holding requirements, the boards of these funds will likely continue to
refer to them voluntarily, if for no other reason than to minimize their own risk of liability. Finally, ratings remain a key
factor in private contractual arrangements to control risk-taking by fund managers and to manage counterparty risk.
More generally, removing references to ratings may address problems with the rating process arising out of complacency, but again, it will not prevent minor estimation errors,
made in good faith, that the CDO structure amplifies. This is
where a rating ceiling can fill the gap.

3.

Lack of competition

Some critics believe the Big Three credit rating agencies
have been sheltered from concerns about reputation because
they constitute an oligopoly, with significant entry barriers.
Views have differed on how much this oligopoly was due to
regulation, and how much to "natural" economic forces, as it
was extraordinarily difficult to attain NRSRO status prior to
125. See Partnoy, supra note 45, at 681-686.
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the Credit Rating Agency Refonn Act of 2006. 126 At least in the
field of structured finance, the recent success of Dominion
Bond Rating Services (DBRS) , which attained NRSRO status in
2007,127 has cast doubt on the idea of a natural oligopoly.
DBRS's market share of the mortgage-backed security market,
non-existent prior to the crisis, climbed to 18 percent in 2008,
and 41 percent in 2009. 128 Moody's share, meanwhile fell from
40 percent in 2008 to 6 percent in 2009. 129
Those who nonetheless believe features of oligopoly persist often call for increased competition in the rating industry.
The problem with this, particularly for CDOs, is that increased
competition could lead to a "race to the bottom" rather than
the top, as rating agencies compete for business by offering
higher ratings to larger CDO tranches than other agencies. 130
Particularly in a bubble, when vigilance is low and fund managers are less circumspect about trying to goose returns, the
existence of more rating agencies would likely provide structured finance issuers with more chances to increase AAA
tranche sizes, exacerbating the problem with CDO ratings.
This, in turn, raises questions about the practice of rating
shopping.

126. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.l7g-1 (2007) (streamlining the registration process for NRSROs).
127. Order Granting Registration ofDBRS Limited as a Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization, Exchange Act Release No. 34-56508,
2007 SEC LEXIS 2187 (Sept. 24, 2007).
128. Aaron Lucchetti & Serena Ng, Still Broken: "Ratings Sh&pping" Lives on
as Congress Debates a Fix, WALL ST. j., May 24, 2010, at AI.
129. Id.
130. A race to the top would mean that competition improved ratings
quality; a race to the bottom would mean competition would hann ratings
quality. Both outcomes are plausible. A study of the impact of Fitch breaking
into corporate bond rating market in 1990s has shown that average rating
quality declined. Bo Becker & Todd Milbourn, Reputation and Competition:
Evidence from the Credit Rating Industry (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No.
09-051, 2009), available at http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/09-051.pdf.
But see Neil A. Doherty et aI., Does Competition Improve Ratings? (Sept. 14,
2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.pfp.gsu.edu/
Research/downloads/Phillips_RA_insurance.pdf (showing that when S&P
broke into the previously niche insurance rating market, challenging monopolist rater AM Best, average rating quality improved).
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Rating shopping

An issuer may "shop" for a rating by determining what rating an agency would assign to a particular debt issuance - either by paying the agency for a preliminary opinion or running numbers through a publicly available rating agency
model - and paying for publication of only the highest rating
or ratings. Rating shopping constitutes a principal vehicle of
the race-to-the-bottom scenario, and is key to explaining why
the issuer-pays conflict of interest might have pernicious effects with respect to RMBS and CDOs. It deserves to be treated
separately from the conflict of interest issue, however, because
even absent conscious decisions or bad modeling by the rating
agencies, rating shopping might lead to inflated ratings. To
the degree that greater complexity leads to greater variance in
the evaluation of credit risk, and as long as there is not a systematic conservative bias in the varied evaluations, choosing
the highest rating will lead to systematically inflated ratings. lsl
Rating shopping likely led to larger AAA tranches for
CDOs than would otherwise have been the case. 132 The SEC
recently attempted to address rating shopping by facilitating
unsolicited ratings of structured financial products, so that
firms that have been passed over for a rating can still express
their views on an offering. I3S If rating shopping can be successfully prevented, it would dampen bad-faith or venal ratings actions by the agencies, but it would be unlikely to kill them off
entirely, especially in the "repeat game" that structured finance has become. 134 Nor would the prevention of rating
shopping affect good faith ratings during bubbles that innocently ignore the tail risk of a product like the CDO. Again, a
CDO ceiling would provide a valuable supplemental safeguard
131. VasiIiki Skreta & Laura Veldkamp, Ratings Shopping and Asset Complexity: A Theory of &tings Inflation (N.Y. Univ. Stern Sch. Of Bus., Working Paper, 2008), availahle at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstracc
id=1295503 (describing a dynamic similar to that of the "winner's curse" in
auction theory, where imperfect information leads to a dispersion of bid
levels around the actual value of the item up for sale, so that the winner
always bids too much); see also Richard Thaler, Anomalies: The Winner's Curse,
2 J. ECON. PERSPS. 191 (1988).
132. See Griffin & Tang, supra note 13, at 20.
133. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5 (2007).
134. In other words, rating agencies could bend at the threat oflosing not
the current deal, but future deals.
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to help prevent hidden risk from building during the next
market euphoria.
CONCLUSION

While conflicts of interest, regulatory arbitrage, lack of
competition, and rating shopping may have helped drive inflated CDO ratings, this was not the fundamental problem
with CDOs. The fundamental problem with structured finance
CDOs is their sensitivity to baseline parameter assumptions,
and their "all-or-nothing" character - paying off with a
probability approaching 1 in normal times, while losing a huge
portion of their value in a systemic crisis.
Placing a ceiling on the ratings a structured finance CDO
can receive would impede its use as a way to hide tail risk, or to
exploit poor quality or outdated ratings of first-level securitizations. A rating ceiling is probably better than an outright ban,
as it allows the use of CDOs to the degree that they serve a
legitimate purpose, while limiting their pernicious effects. Imposing a ceiling on structured finance CDO ratings is not a
silver bullet, but it could prove an effective way to limit risk
and to help avoid systemic crises in the future.
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